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My first aim in this paper is to show that the transparency claim 
cannot serve the purpose to which it is assigned; that is, the 
idea that perceptual experience is transparent is no help 
whatsoever in motivating an externalist account of phenomenal 
character. My second aim is to show that the internalist qualia 
theorist’s response to the transparency idea has been 
unnecessarily concessive to the externalist. Surprisingly, 
internalists seem to allow that much of the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience depends essentially (and 
not just causally) upon externally located properties. They 
argue that we can also be aware of internal, non-intentional 
qualia. I present an alternative response the internalist can 
make to the transparency claim: phenomenal character is 
wholly internal, and seeming to be aware of externally located 
properties just is being aware of internally constituted 
experiential features. 
Keywords: perception, perceptual experience, transparency, 
representationalism, externalism, qualia theory. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea that perceptual experience is transparent has been used by 
philosophers who hold an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual 
experience—naïve realists and externalist representationalists. In the next 
section, I will argue that we must distinguish between what I call 
phenomenological transparency and metaphysical transparency. 
Perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent if and only if it 
is true that the properties we are aware of during a perceptual experience 
all seem to us to be externally located. 
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Perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent if and only if all the 
properties we are aware of are in fact externally located. 
The difference between these two kinds of transparency should be perfectly 
obvious, and yet, as we will see, they have often been conflated. It is essential 
that we keep these two notions distinct since introspection could only ever 
reveal phenomenological transparency, and yet the externalist needs to 
establish metaphysical transparency. Even if we allow that perceptual 
experience is phenomenologically transparent, I will argue that we have no 
good reason for thinking that we can make the transition from 
phenomenological to metaphysical transparency. Consequently, the notion of 
transparency turns out to be a free-wheeling cog in the debate about the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the standard response internalist 
qualia theorists make when faced with the claim that perceptual experience is 
transparent. This will be the subject of the final section. Qualia theorists claim 
that introspection reveals properties which seem to be (and in fact are) 
properties of our own experiences. However, and this is very surprising, when 
we consider the qualia theorist’s analysis in more detail, we find that it allows 
that almost all of the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience 
depends essentially (and not just causally) upon externally located 
properties. 1 In other words, this account seems to grant much of the 
externalist’s analysis of the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience. I 
argue that this response is far too concessive to the externalist. I describe an 
alternative response the qualia theorist can make to the externalist’s 
transparency claim. They can claim that the phenomenal character of our 
perceptual experiences is entirely internally constituted, and it just seems to us 
that the relevant phenomenal properties are externally located. Indeed, our 
awareness of properties which seem to be externally located is in fact an 
awareness of internally constituted features of our experience.2 
                                                        
1 A mental state is internal if ‘it does not depend—except perhaps causally—upon what goes on "outside 
the head" of the experiencer’ (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 521). Externalists hold that our experiences depend 
essentially, and not just causally, on relations to objects and/ or properties in our mind-independent 
environment. 
2 Of course, the internalist owes us an explanation of what it means to be aware of internally constituted 
features of one’s experience. One option would be to hold that there is a twoplace awareness relation to qualia. 
Another option would be to go adverbialist and deny that ‘awareness’, here, is a two-place relation. If qualia 
are held to be mental (and not physical) properties, then the first of these views would have much in common 
with the sense-data theory—perceptual experiences will have an act/object structure, even though the ‘object’ 
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II. A DISTINCTION: PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRANSPARENCY 
AND METAPHYSICAL TRANSPARENCY 
According to the transparency claim, when we introspect our perceptual 
experiences, we do not seem to be aware of internal features of our experience. 
We seem only to be aware of externally located properties. Gilbert Harman 
provides us with one of the most frequently quoted examples of this idea: 
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all 
experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them 
are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she 
experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her 
experiences. . . Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic 
features of your visual experience. I predict that you will find that the 
only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the 
presented tree. . . (Harman 1990: 39) 
The claim that perceptual experience is transparent should, in the first instance, 
be understood as a claim about the phenomenology of perceptual experience. 
Since we are to use introspection to determine whether or not our perceptual 
experiences exhibit transparency, the debate about whether or not our 
perceptual experiences are in fact transparent must begin with whether it seems 
to us that the only properties we are aware of during our perceptual experiences 
are externally located properties. In which case, if introspection leads us to 
affirm that perceptual experiences are transparent, what we are affirming is 
that it seems to us that we are only aware of externally located properties. 
Likewise, if introspection leads us to deny that perceptual experiences are 
transparent, what we are denying is that it seems to us that we are only aware 
of externally located properties. 
Of course, many philosophers who appeal to the notion of transparency do 
so in order to make a claim about the metaphysics of perceptual experience. 
They want to promote the idea that perceptual experiences are metaphysically 
transparent, that the phenomenal character of the experience depends 
                                                        
is not externally located. Note, views upon which perceptual experiences involve a relation to a mental 
particular are typically thought to be internalist. As such, metaphysical transparency will be denied by 
proponents of these positions. This is significant because it demonstrates that the debate over whether 
perceptual experiences have an act/object structure does not map onto the debate over whether perceptual 
experiences are metaphysically transparent. Both versions of the qualia theory I have described here and the 
sense-data theory must deny metaphysical transparency, even though the relational version of qualia theory 
and the sense-data theory endorse the act/object model. 
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essentially on the subject standing in a two-place awareness relation to 
properties which are in fact externally located. There are two positions in the 
philosophy of perception which make use of transparency in this way: naïve 
realism, which is the view that perceptual experiences are partly constituted 
by external objects and properties (Brewer 2006; Campbell 2002) and 
externalist representationalism, which is the view that the phenomenal 
character of our perceptual experience is not realized by our internal 
constitution, but depends essentially upon the externally located properties 
which are represented during perceptual experience (Dretske 1995, 1996, 
2000; Lycan 1996; Tye 1995, 2000, 2014).3 
In this section, I will explain why the distinction between phenomenological 
and metaphysical transparency is important and provide some examples of 
cases where it is ignored. But first, a point of clarification is in order. The 
transparency claim is sometimes taken to be an argument for 
representationalism, with those who deny that perceptual experiences are 
transparent taking their arguments against transparency to be arguments 
against representationalism. Perhaps this would be appropriate if discussions 
about transparency were limited to discussions about phenomenological 
transparency; that is, if proponents of the transparency idea were only trying 
to establish that phenomenal character is constituted by a relation to properties 
which seem to us to be externally located. It would then be natural to interpret 
this in representationalist terms and say that phenomenal character is co-
extensive with properties we represent objects as having, whilst remaining 
neutral about whether the properties, and indeed the objects, are in fact 
externally located. However, it is clear from the way transparency is described, 
and the examples used to illustrate the idea (see those quoted in this section 
and Section IV) that neither those philosophers who endorse it, nor those who 
deny it, understand the idea of transparency in the purely phenomenological 
sense.4 Participants in the debate clearly have metaphysical transparency in 
mind, and metaphysical transparency only supports externalist views: naïve 
realism and the externalist version of representationalism. Consequently, 
while an argument against metaphysical transparency is an argument against 
                                                        
3 It is best to frame the transparency debate as a debate over whether all the properties one experiences are 
experienced as being externally located rather than as a debate over whether we seem to be aware of properties 
of our experiences. This is because, for the naïve realist, externally located objects and properties partly 
constitute our experiences, so in being aware of externally located objects and properties we are also aware of 
properties of our experience. Matthew Kennedy makes this point in his 2009. 
4 Speaks (2014) may be an exception. 
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externalism, it is not (necessarily) an argument against representationalism 
tout court. (Charles Siewert also makes this point in his 2003.) It is possible to 
be a representationalist and hold that phenomenal character and 
representational content are co-extensive (in other words, there is no need to 
posit additional non-representational/ non-intentional qualia to explain 
phenomenal character), while holding that phenomenal character (hence 
representational content) are internally realized. Internalist representationalists 
deny metaphysical transparency and the existence of non-intentional qualia. 
(For the contemporary origins of this view; see Horgan and Tienson 2002; 
Loar 2003a,b.5)6 
Let us return now to the distinction between phenomenological and 
metaphysical transparency. One way of using an appeal to the transparency of 
perceptual experience to argue for an externalist account of phenomenal 
character is to argue that perceptual experiences are phenomenologically 
transparent, and claim that the best explanation of this is their being 
metaphysically transparent. Alternatively, one could argue that our account of 
the metaphysics of perceptual experience should accord with the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. Many philosophers are reluctant to 
charge our perceptual experiences with being radically inaccurate or 
misleading. Both of these routes are intuitive (although I think ultimately 
unsuccessful) ways of trying to use phenomenological transparency to 
establish transparency as a metaphysical thesis about perceptual experience. I 
will consider this matter in more detail in the next section. For now, the 
important point to note is that the question of whether it seems to us that our 
perceptual experiences consist in two-place awareness relations to externally 
located properties is independent from the question of whether, as a matter of 
fact, they consist in two-place awareness relations to externally located 
properties. That is, the question of whether perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent is distinct from the question of whether 
perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent. 
                                                        
5 Brian Loar is often listed as a proponent of the qualia view. This is a mistake if the qualia view is 
understood in the standard way; the view according to which qualia are non-intentional properties of experience 
which must be posited to fully explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. For Loar, qualia are 
intrinsically intentional and so his view is a version of internalist intentionalism. Loar does not think that we 
need to posit non-intentional properties to explain perceptual experience. 
6 It is, of course, also possible to argue against the representationalist view that phenomenal character and 
representational content are co-extensive without depending upon the notion of transparency. See Millar 
(2011). 
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Now, it should be obvious that introspection is silent on the matter of the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience. And yet one occasionally comes across 
the assumption that the metaphysical transparency of perceptual experience is 
itself revealed through introspection. This manoeuvre by-passes the claim that 
perceptual experiences are phenomenologically transparent altogether. 
Consider the following: 
The key transparency claims are as follows: in a case of normal 
perception, if we introspect: 
(1) We are not aware of features of our visual experience. 
(2) We are not aware of the visual experience itself. 
(3) We cannot attend to features of the visual experience. 
(4) The only features of which we are aware and to which we can attend are 
external features (colors and shapes of surfaces, for example) (Tye 2014: 
40). 
Michael Tye is clearly defining metaphysical transparency here, and the 
assumption seems to be that the truth of these claims is revealed by 
introspection. However, metaphysical transparency is not something that can 
be revealed by introspection—it must be argued for, perhaps using the 
phenomenological transparency of perceptual experience as a premise. 
Although it is quite rare to find philosophers assuming from the outset that 
introspection can reveal metaphysical transparency, it is common to find the 
two kinds of transparency being conflated: 
Via introspection, you are directly aware of a range of qualities that you 
experience as being qualities of surfaces at varying distances away and 
orientations and thereby you are aware of the phenomenal character of 
your experience. By being aware of the external qualities, you are aware 
of what it is like for you. (Tye 2000: 47, my emphasis.) 
The first italicized phrase makes the claim that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent. One can experience qualities as being 
qualities of surfaces regardless of whether the surfaces actually possess these 
properties, indeed, regardless of whether there are in fact any surfaces present. 
However, the final italicized phrase makes the claim that perceptual 
experience is metaphysically transparent. It is claimed that the phenomenal 
character of one’s perceptual experience is constituted by properties which are 
in fact externally located: one is aware ‘of the external qualities’. 
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Amy Kind’s discussion of Tye’s transparency claim inherits this confusion. 
She describes Tye’s view in the following way: 
In introspecting a visual experience of object O, one is not directly aware 
of any qualities of the experience itself but only of a range of qualities 
experienced as being qualities of the surfaces of O (let us call these 
‘surface qualities’). It is only by being aware of these surface qualities 
that one is aware that one’s visual experience has the phenomenal 
character that it does. (Kind 2003: 231, my emphasis.) 
The first italicized phrase makes the claim that perceptual experience is 
metaphysically transparent. The second italicized phrase can be understood as 
describing phenomenological transparency, since the qualities in question are 
experienced as being qualities of surfaces (whether they are in fact qualities of 
the surfaces is left open). The final italicized statement is ambiguous (the 
ambiguity turns on whether it is appropriate to call properties that seem to be 
surface properties ‘surface properties’); however, it is most naturally read as 
describing metaphysical transparency—the phenomenal character of the 
experience is constituted by properties which are in fact externally located. 
Again, the fact (if it is one) that it seems to us when we introspect our 
perceptual experiences that all the properties which constitute the phenomenal 
character of our experience are externally located tells us nothing (yet) about 
whether all these properties are in fact externally located. As I have explained, 
the conflation between phenomenological and metaphysical transparency is 
present in Tye’s original argument; however, it is significant that Kind (who 
is keen to deny the force of transparency claims) fails to notice it. 
The prevalence of this conflation between phenomenological and 
metaphysical transparency is evidenced by the fact that a number of 
philosophers offer an inaccurate rendering of the Harman passage I quoted 
earlier. The last line of Harman’s description of transparency reads: ‘I predict 
that you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be 
features of the presented tree’. Martine Nida Rümelin, Daniel Stoljar and Tye 
all quote¨ Harman thus: ‘I predict that you will find that the only features there 
to turn your attention to will be features of the tree’ (Nida Rümelin¨ 2007; 
Stoljar 2004; Tye 2014). The removal of ‘presented’ changes Harman’s 
description of phenomenological transparency into a description of 
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metaphysical transparency.7This confusion over the two kinds of transparency 
is perpetuated by members of both sides of the transparency debate. Loar 
describes the transparency claim as the view that: 
visual experience is transparent: when you attend to a visual experience 
as it is going on, you will notice its objects, i.e. the things you see or 
apparently see, including their apparent properties and relations, and 
you will notice your (diaphanous) visual relation to those external objects 
and properties. (Loar 2003a: 1, my emphasis.) 
Much of this description fits with the idea of phenomenological transparency 
(note the use of ‘apparently see’ and ‘apparent properties and relations’ in the 
first italicized phrase), but the second italicized phrase can only be read as a 
description of metaphysical transparency. The term ‘apparent’ disappears and 
our perceptual experience becomes a relation to external objects and 
properties. 
It is rather worrying that this conflation of metaphysical and 
phenomenological transparency, prevalent in the literature, has remained 
unnoticed.8 It is obvious after paying the matter a little consideration that 
introspection is not the sort of thing that could possibly reveal this kind of 
metaphysical truth about perceptual experience. It is quite clear that the 
transparency idea can only be deployed with the aim of establishing that 
perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent. That is, if it is 
successful, the transparency claim can show that all the properties we are 
aware of during a perceptual experience seem to be externally located 
properties. As it stands, the idea of transparency tells us nothing about the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience. 
                                                        
7 Although Harman’s remarks on transparency can be interpreted as describing phenomenological (rather than 
metaphysical) transparency, it is clear from the fact that Harman deems it necessary to postulate ‘intentional 
objects’ (understood in a rather substantive sense) to explain hallucinatory cases that he does in fact regard 
perceptual experience as being metaphysically transparent. (It is only if perceptual experiences are 
metaphysically transparent that there needs to be a relatum in the hallucinatory case.) 
8  Galen Strawson makes a distinction between ‘phenomenological transparentism’ and ‘metaphysical 
transparentism’, although his distinction is rather different from mine. Strawson is concerned with the idea of 
direct perception, and he defines metaphysical transparentism as the view that ‘the process of perception of an 
object does in fact metaphysically involve a passage through something—a sensation—even if we experience 
ourselves as directly in contact with the object’ (2015: 243). He rejects metaphysical transparentism because 
he feels it does not allow perception to be genuinely direct. I have defined metaphysical transparency as the 
idea that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences depends essentially upon properties which 
are externally located. 
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III. IS PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRANSPARENCY EVIDENCE OF 
METAPHYSICAL TRANSPARENCY? 
I have argued that it is only legitimate to use introspection in the attempt to 
establish phenomenological transparency. Note, it is not my concern to assess 
whether perceptual experience is in fact phenomenologically transparent, nor 
indeed whether introspection can ultimately decide the issue. My point is that 
it is only legitimate to use introspection with the aim of establishing how our 
experiences seem to us. It cannot be used to reveal the metaphysical nature of 
our experiences. 
In this section, I want to consider whether there are any reasons for thinking 
that the phenomenological transparency of perceptual experience could be 
used to argue that perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent. 
Therefore, let’s assume for the sake of argument that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent. When we introspect our perceptual 
experiences, the properties we are aware of all seem to be externally located. 
Should we take this as evidence of metaphysical transparency, that all the 
properties we are aware of are in fact externally located? It may seem natural 
to think that we should, that in the absence of reasons to think otherwise, we 
should assume that things are as they seem.9 However, it seems to me that we 
do have a very good reason for questioning whether things are as they seem 
when it comes to our perceptual experiences. The existence of illusions and 
hallucinations provides us with a particularly compelling reason to doubt 
whether all our perceptual experiences involve properties which are externally 
located. Although hallucinations are quite rare, minor illusions are extremely 
common; we very often make mistakes about the colour, shape, size and 
location of the objects and properties in our environment. In other words, we 
frequently ascribe to objects properties they do not in fact possess. It seems, 
then, that we have good grounds for questioning our initial assumption that the 
fact that the phenomenal character of our experience seems to depend 
essentially on externally located properties is an indication that it genuinely 
does. 
Indeed, whenever we find ourselves considering whether the way things 
seem to us reflects the underlying metaphysical reality, it seems reasonable to 
stipulate that our default position should be a sceptical one. History is replete 
with failed attempts to move from something’s seeming to be a certain way to 
                                                        
9 This position is known as phenomenal conservatism. (See Huemer 2001; Tucker 2013.) 
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its actually being that way. (Some well-known examples: the Earth is flat; the 
sun orbits the Earth; all organisms were designed by a creator; human beings 
cannot be purely physical beings and so on.) If the move from 
phenomenological transparency to metaphysical transparency is going to be 
credible in the case of perceptual experience, we need to be provided with a 
good argument. 
III.1 The argument that phenomenology reflects metaphysics 
Unfortunately, even those philosophers who do not simply equate 
phenomenological and metaphysical transparency seem to assume that the 
move from the first kind of transparency to the second is such a natural one 
that nothing much is required in the way of actual argument. Michael Martin 
gives voice to one reason for moving from phenomenological transparency to 
metaphysical transparency: ‘surely it is preferable, if possible, to endorse a 
theory of perception that better fits the introspective data’ (Martin 2002: 379). 
Whilst undeniably tempting, this is not a particularly persuasive reason given 
our humbling track-record of failed attempts to determine metaphysics from 
how things seem to us. Of course, our metaphysical theories must be able to 
explain the phenomenology of our experiences—we certainly must not reject 
our experiences simply because they fit uneasily with our theories. However, 
our theories can explain the phenomenology of our experiences without 
mirroring or matching how things seem in experience. To take an obvious 
example, the theory that the Earth orbits the sun explains our experience as of 
the sun orbiting the Earth. But our theory does not, of course, match or mirror 
our experience—quite the contrary. 
Not only is the idea that our theory should mirror the findings of 
introspection unconvincing; it is an idea that any disjunctivist would do well 
to avoid. Disjunctivism involves a rejection of the idea that subjectively 
indistinguishable hallucinations form a common kind with normal perceptual 
experiences. Since this common kind claim is motivated primarily by 
introspective evidence, disjunctivists must say that introspection misleads us 
in this instance. The idea that we should reject the findings of introspection 
and refuse to move from the phenomenological common kind claim (it seems 
to us in introspection that normal and hallucinatory experiences form a 
common kind) to the metaphysical common kind claim (these experiences 
really do form a common kind) is in tension with the idea that we should think 
 11 
 
that perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent simply because it 
seems to be. Rejecting the findings of introspection in one case but not in 
others would be ad hoc. 
III.2 The argument from the best explanation 
The other reason for thinking that an appeal to phenomenological transparency 
might be useful for establishing metaphysical transparency is that the 
metaphysical transparency of perceptual experience would best explain their 
phenomenological transparency. Unfortunately, since the mistake of equating 
these notions is so pervasive, it is difficult to find examples of detailed best 
explanation arguments for deriving the metaphysical claim from the 
phenomenological claim. However, I will consider a number of reasons we 
might have for thinking that metaphysical transparency is the best explanation 
for phenomenological transparency, and argue that none of them are 
persuasive. 
Perhaps, the most widely held idea is that if perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent and not metaphysically transparent, then 
perceptual experience is hugely erroneous. Tye says: 
To suppose that the qualities of which perceivers are directly aware in 
undergoing ordinary, everyday visual experiences are really qualities of 
the experiences would be to convict such experiences of massive error. 
That is just not credible. It seems totally implausible to hold that visual 
experience is systematically misleading in this way. (2000: 46) 
It is difficult to identify precisely why it should be implausible for our 
experiences to be systematically misleading. One possible explanation is that 
we have the kinds of perceptual experiences we do because such experiences 
benefitted our evolutionary ancestors and aided their survival. Since we are 
organisms which must successfully interact with the world in order to survive, 
our perceptual experience must be accurate in order for us to be able to do this. 
In other words, we should think that perceptual experience is metaphysically 
transparent, because, if it was misleading, we could not possibly make our way 
around the world so successfully. 
This idea turns on an assumption that is widely made, that success depends 
on accuracy. While this assumption is certainly prima facie intuitive, a little 
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reflection reveals its naivety. In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche launches 
what is now a famous attack on the idea that success requires accuracy, and 
his remarks seem in keeping with our scientific understanding of at least some 
elements of perceptual experience.10 Let me give one example. Most scientists 
and many philosophers believe that our colour experiences do not accurately 
reflect those properties of objects that are involved in our coming to have 
colour experiences. In other words, objects do not have ‘colours-as-we-see-
them’ (see Mackie 1976 for the origins of this phrase). Certainly, objects have 
properties which are causally implicated in our having colour experience, but 
only a very few philosophers (and no scientists that I am aware of) think that 
objects have colour properties in the way common-sense suggests. (See Gow 
2014 for an argument that even (realist) physicalism about colour properties is 
a version of eliminativism about colours qua colours-as-we-see-them.) If the 
scientists are right then our colour experiences, which are incredibly useful in 
enabling us easily to distinguish objects from each other, recognize objects 
quickly and so on, are in fact misleading. They do not reveal how objects are 
‘in themselves’. 
The upshot of this is that perceptual experience does not need to be accurate 
to be successful. 11  And, in fact, this point stands regardless of the actual 
metaphysics of colour properties. Imagine a world where no objects are 
coloured; everyone involved in the colour debate can agree that if the 
organisms living in such a world evolved to see objects as having colour 
properties, they would find it much easier to navigate around their world. This 
is enough to show that success does not depend on accuracy. It is perfectly 
possible for our experiences to be the result of causal interactions with our 
environment, and to give rise to behaviour which is successful, without those 
experiences having to ‘match’ the way our environment really is. Since 
success is the principle by which the process of natural selection operates, and 
our phenomenologically transparent perceptual experiences can be successful 
whether or not they are metaphysically transparent, their success cannot 
support a best explanation argument for metaphysical transparency. 
                                                        
10 See in particular part one: on the prejudices of philosophers. 
11  Note David Pitt’s response to the quotation from Tye: ‘On the contrary, I would argue, if visual 
experience were not systematically misleading—if it didn’t present itself as something it is not (viz., external 
reality)—it would be completely useless. Transparency is an illusion made necessary by the facts that what 
experience is supposed to represent is external to the mind, while experience itself is internal.’ (Pitt 2011: 154 
f12) 
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Tye does offer a more explicit best explanation argument for the idea that 
perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent. However, his argument 
begins with the assumption that introspection reveals that we are not aware of 
properties of experiences: 
If you are attending to how things look to you, as opposed to how they 
are independent of how they look, you are bringing to bear your faculty 
of introspection. But in so doing, you are not aware of any inner object 
or thing. The only objects of which you are aware are the external ones 
making up the scene before your eyes. (Tye 2000: 46–7) 
In other words, when Tye claims that his account (which is committed to 
metaphysical transparency) is the best explanation of phenomenological 
transparency, he means it is a better explanation than those theories 
which already agree that we are not aware of properties of our 
experiences (he mentions the sense-data theory as an example). 
(Representationalism) in its pure form, I maintain, gives us the best 
account of the nature of visual experience and its phenomenal character, 
consistent with what introspection tells us. (Tye 2000: 112, my 
emphasis.) 
Tye does not argue that metaphysical transparency is a better explanation for 
phenomenological transparency than the qualia theorist’s account, upon which 
we are actually aware of properties or features of our experiences. His 
conflation of phenomenological and metaphysical transparency means he has 
already assumed that introspection demonstrates the falsity of this view. Since 
Tye’s best explanation argument clearly begs the question against the qualia 
theorist, it cannot establish that metaphysical transparency is the best 
explanation for phenomenological transparency.12 
There may be an epistemological reason for thinking that metaphysical 
transparency provides the best explanation for the phenomenological 
transparency of perceptual experience. One of the best-known criticisms made 
against the sense-data theory (and other versions of indirect realism) is that it 
imposes a barrier between the perceiver and the world, and this results in 
                                                        
12 Whether Tye is right that his view provides a better explanation of our perceptual experiences than the 
sense-data theory is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this paper. For present purposes, the important point 
to note is that Tye fails to demonstrate that metaphysical transparency is the best explanation for 
phenomenological transparency, since his argument assumes from the outset that the qualia theory is false. 
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scepticism about the very existence of the external world. It may be thought 
that the internalist qualia theorist’s view that perceptual experience involves 
internally realized properties (with externally located objects and properties 
playing a merely causal role) invites the same objection. In which case, the 
externalist can claim that metaphysical transparency is the best explanation for 
the phenomenological transparency of our perceptual experiences—if our 
perceptual experiences are metaphysically transparent then scepticism does 
not arise.13 
Of course, one response the qualia theorist can make is simply to deny that 
considerations about scepticism have any bearing on whether one theory is a 
better explanation for our experiences than another. Scepticism may be an 
unwelcome and undesirable consequence of a theory, but we cannot reject a 
theory solely because we find its outcome disagreeable. However, qualia 
theorists can also deny that their position results in scepticism. The traditional 
response to this kind of objection (originating with Locke (1689: IV.XI)) can 
be deployed just as successfully by the qualia theorist: realism about mind-
independent entities is the best explanation of certain features of our perceptual 
experiences, such as their regularity, coherence and spontaneity. An 
explanation that has external entities playing a vital causal role in the 
production of our perceptual experiences is more plausible than any 
explanation offered by the sceptic. Perhaps the qualia theory has an advantage 
over the sense-data theory since sense-data are mental objects, and so it is more 
difficult to explain their relationship with us and with the external (presumably 
physical) world. Since scepticism is not an inevitable consequence of those 
theories which deny that perceptual experiences are metaphysically 
transparent, externalists cannot argue that metaphysical transparency is 
required to avoid scepticism. 
I have argued that we have yet to be provided with a successful argument 
for the claim that metaphysical transparency is the best explanation for 
phenomenological transparency. What is more, there are a number of positive 
reasons for doubting that such an explanation will be forthcoming. Although 
some philosophers believe that hallucinations are metaphysically transparent, 
it is not clear that their being so is the best explanation for their 
phenomenological transparency (granting for the sake of argument that they 
are indeed phenomenologically transparent). Producing something to be the 
                                                        
13 I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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mind-independent relatum in hallucinatory cases is a difficult task, and one 
that inevitably requires embracing entities with a questionable metaphysical 
status. Most philosophers who claim that hallucinations are metaphysically 
transparent posit uninstantiated properties as the external (mind-independent) 
entities of which we are aware. However, uninstantiated properties are abstract 
entities, and it is far from obvious that an awareness relation to abstracta is the 
best explanation of hallucinations.14 If our perceptual experiences are part of 
the concrete, spatiotemporal world, then it could be considered problematic to 
have them depend upon abstracta (see Kriegel 2011 for a detailed criticism 
along these lines; also, see Papineau 2014). I am not suggesting that we must 
reject out of hand the idea that perceptual experiences involve essential 
relations to abstracta, my point is simply that more work must be done before 
metaphysical transparency can be considered the best explanation of the 
phenomenological transparency of these experiences. To begin with, we are 
owed an explanation of how our concrete, spatiotemporal perceptual 
experiences can depend for their existence upon non-physical entities. This 
would seem to require a rejection of the causal closure of the physical world 
since nonphysical entities would be affecting our perceptual system.15 
Furthermore, we require an account of the awareness relation which is said to 
obtain between the perceiver and the abstract entity. 
Charles Siewert offers a positive reason for denying the very possibility of 
moving from phenomenological to metaphysical transparency on an 
externalist representationalist’s framework. Since externalist 
representationalists want to reduce phenomenal character to representational 
content, they need a way of specifying the latter that does not appeal to the 
former, for if it does their account will be circular. It is clear that introspection, 
which can only reveal how things seem phenomenologically, will not be able 
to provide this, and so Siewert argues that an appeal to phenomenological 
transparency will never deliver metaphysical transparency (2003: 30). (This is 
my terminology, not Siewert’s.) 
                                                        
14 Tye and Fred Dretske both claim that hallucinations involve the awareness of uninstantiated properties 
(Tye 2000, 2014; Dretske 1995, 2000). Mark Johnston’s account of hallucination posits uninstantiated 
property complexes (2004), and Adam Pautz (who actually defends internalism— see 2014) also holds a 
relational account of hallucination. (Pautz, 2007) Also see Bealer (1982), Bengson et al. (2011), Forrest 
(2005), McGinn (1999) and Sosa (2007) for similar views. William Lycan analyses hallucinations as 
relations to intentional objects which exist in other possible worlds (1996). Of course, these are also abstract 
entities. See Thompson (2008) and Pitt (MS) for discussion. Incidentally, the fact that so many philosophers 
endorse the idea that hallucinations are metaphysically transparent means that Tim Crane is mistaken when 
he claims that hallucinations are an easy counter-example to the externalist’s view (2006).  
15 I owe this point to Dan Cavedon-Taylor. 
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To summarize: I have argued that introspection can only tell us about the 
phenomenology of perceptual experience. The (alleged) fact that perceptual 
experiences are phenomenologically transparent is no indication that they are 
metaphysically transparent. Of course, this is not to say that perceptual 
experiences are not metaphysically transparent, my claim is simply that 
metaphysical transparency cannot be derived from phenomenological 
transparency—it is a mistake to think that phenomenology reflects 
metaphysics, and none of the reasons for thinking that metaphysical 
transparency provides the best explanation for phenomenological transparency 
are decisive. Although this conclusion is rather modest, it is significant, since 
the transparency argument is often held to be a particularly compelling 
argument for externalism. I have shown that there seem to be no good reasons 
for thinking we can derive metaphysical transparency from phenomenological 
transparency and a number of good reasons for thinking that we cannot. 
IV. THE INTERNALIST RESPONSE TO TRANSPARENCY 
As we have seen, even if perceptual experience is phenomenologically 
transparent, it does not follow that it is metaphysically transparent. There is an 
important lesson to be learnt from this. Internalists are internalists about the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience—they hold that the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience is internally constituted. Therefore, there is 
no need for the internalist to deny that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent. After all, the internalist claim that the 
phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences is wholly internally 
constituted is entirely compatible with its seeming to the subject that 
phenomenal character depends essentially on properties which are externally 
located. 
I suspect that internalists deny phenomenological transparency because they 
must (as internalists) deny metaphysical transparency, and the frequently made 
mistake of equating phenomenological and metaphysical transparency leads 
them to believe that refuting the latter requires refuting the former. However, 
I have shown that the two kinds of transparency claim are independent from 
each other. Consequently, not only is it unnecessary for the internalist to deny 
phenomenological transparency (we have yet to be presented with a good 
reason for thinking that phenomenological transparency is evidence of 
metaphysical transparency); a refutation of phenomenological transparency 
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will not constitute a refutation of metaphysical transparency. That is, even if 
the internalist qualia theorist can conclusively demonstrate that (at least some 
of) our perceptual experiences are not phenomenologically transparent, it is 
open to the externalist to insist that the experiences in question are, 
nevertheless, metaphysically transparent. Take after-images and phosphenes 
for example. Qualia theorists have argued that after-image and phosphene 
experiences are not phenomenologically transparent. It does not seem that 
these experiences involve an awareness of externally located properties; in 
fact, it seems that we are aware of internally constituted features of our 
experience (Boghossian and Velleman 1997; Block 2003; Kind 2008). Now, 
there is no reason why the externalist cannot concede this point about the 
phenomenology of such experiences, yet claim that after-image and phosphene 
experiences are metaphysically transparent nonetheless. After all, externalists 
have a story to tell about why we should think that hallucinations are 
metaphysically transparent —they involve an awareness of uninstantiated 
properties. The same story can be told about after-images and phosphenes, 
while acknowledging that such experiences are not phenomenologically 
transparent. 
The important point is this: it could be the case that properties which seem 
to be externally located are in fact internally constituted; likewise, it could be 
the case that properties which seem to be internally constituted are in fact 
externally located. In other words, neither the confirmation nor the refutation 
of phenomenological transparency can be used as evidence for or against 
metaphysical transparency. Just as externalists are mistaken if they think they 
can use the phenomenological transparency of perceptual experience as 
evidence of their view that perceptual experiences are metaphysically 
transparent, qualia theorists are mistaken if they think that a refutation of 
phenomenological transparency is a refutation of metaphysical transparency. 
There is something rather odd about the internalist reaction to the 
transparency claim. When we examine their response in more detail, we find 
that they actually seem to endorse much of the externalist’s metaphysical 
framework. For the purpose of the following discussion, it will be useful to 
adopt (and adapt) a distinction given to us by Martin (2002), between the 
positive and negative claims involved in transparency.15 When we restrict our 
analysis to phenomenological transparency, the positive claim is: 
                                                        
15 Siewert (2003) and Stoljar (2004) also make this kind of distinction. 
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(P+) The phenomenal character of perceptual experience is at least partly 
constituted by an awareness of properties which seem to be externally located. 
 
If our concern is with metaphysical transparency, the positive claim is: 
(M+) The phenomenal character of perceptual experience is at least partly 
constituted by an awareness of properties which are in fact externally located. 
 
Understood phenomenologically, the negative claim is: 
(P−) We do not seem to be aware of internally realised features of our 
perceptual experiences. 
 
Understood metaphysically, the negative claim is: 
(M−) We are not aware of internally realised features of our perceptual 
experiences. 
The claim that perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent 
involves endorsing (P+) and (P–). The claim that perceptual experience is 
metaphysically transparent involves endorsing (M+) and (M–). 
Internalist qualia theorists deny that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent by rejecting (P–), but they typically endorse 
(P+). In other words, they agree that it seems to us that externally located 
properties are essentially responsible for much of the phenomenal character of 
our perceptual experience (so far so good), but they claim that we also seem 
to be aware of features of our experiences, or qualia. Qualia theorists claim 
that blurriness, phosphenes and after-images (for example) involve properties 
which seem to be, and are in fact, internally realized (Boghossian and 
Velleman 1997; Block 1996, 2003; Kind 2003, 2008). 
However, when granting that perceptual experiences do possess the positive 
feature of phenomenological transparency, internalist qualia theorists (and 
internalist representationalists) often seem to be endorsing the positive feature 
in both its phenomenological and its metaphysical formulations—they endorse 
(P+) and (M+). That is, they seem to concede not only that much of the 
phenomenal character of our perceptual experiences seems to depend 
essentially upon externally located properties, but that much of it actually does 
depend essentially—and not just causally—upon externally located properties. 
Here are a few examples: 
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Loar states that he endorses the idea that normal visual experience is 
transparent (2003a: 1). Now, Loar holds that normal visual experiences can be 
phenomenologically the same as hallucinatory experiences, or experiences had 
by our ‘brain in a vat’ twin, so he could happily endorse the idea that 
hallucinations are phenomenologically transparent. The fact that he restricts 
his attribution of transparency to normal visual experiences suggests that he 
must have metaphysical transparency in mind.16Siewert says: 
 
When something looks blue or square to me – to take Tye’s example – 
and I attend to how it looks to me, I do not somehow attend just to 
blueness or squareness, without attending to its looking blue or square 
to me. I might put this point by saying that when, for example, there is 
some figure that looks blue and square to me, and I attend to how it looks 
to me, its looking to me that way ‘falls within the scope of my attention’, 
just as much as, and together with, the figure itself and its blueness and 
squareness. The figure, its properties, and its appearing to me, all come 
together as a package, as far as this act of attention is concerned. I may 
only look at the blue square – I certainly don’t look at my visual 
experience of it. However, I can, while looking at the blue square, attend 
to its looking to me as it does. (Siewert 2003: 20, my emphasis.)  
And Crane: 
To be sure, it is generally true that the things we see directly are ordinary 
things and their properties: and in this sense we normally ‘see through’ 
experiences to the real world objects and properties themselves. . . .it is 
generally true that we are not directly aware of properties of experiences 
themselves. But there also seem to be uncontroversial cases where we 
are, and it is not obvious why we should argue them away. (Crane 2006: 
9, my emphasis.)  
Kind says: 
                                                        
16 My point, here, depends on the assumption that Loar’s use of the term ‘normal’ is intended to contrast 
experiences so defined with illusory or hallucinatory experiences. If he means something else by ‘normal’, 
then my criticism may not apply. 
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(T)he fact that we attend to worldly objects in introspectively attending 
to our perceptual experiences of worldly objects, even essentially so, 
does not mean that this is all we do. (Kind 2008: 295, my emphasis) 
And finally, Ned Block, who is probably the most well-known opponent of the 
transparency claim, says: 
According to the representationist, all awareness of those sensations 
could consist in is awareness of the colored moving expanses that are 
represented by them. My view is that one can be aware of something 
more. (Block 2003: 13, my emphasis.) 
It seems to me that what these writers should concede is that phenomenological 
transparency is true for some properties—it does seem that the blue, for 
example, is externally located and not internally realized. However, because 
of the wide-spread conflation of phenomenological and metaphysical 
transparency, we find internalist philosophers conceding the metaphysical 
transparency of these properties. All of these passages demonstrate a 
commitment to the idea that much of the phenomenal character of our 
experience—the fact that it involves ‘blueness’, ‘squareness’ and so on—
essentially depends upon properties which are, as a matter of fact, externally 
located. They are agreeing with the externalist that the blueness not only seems 
to be an externally located property, but that it actually is. 
The qualia theorists’ quarrel with the externalist metaphysical transparency 
claim seems to be merely a matter of scope. Qualia theorists accept the 
externalist analysis of almost all of the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience, they just insist that there are some (a very few) properties which 
do not admit of externalist analysis—blurriness and after-images, for example. 
This is surprising; the fundamental tenet of internalism is that all phenomenal 
character is ‘in the head’, not just some rare features we might experience 
when we apply slight pressure to our eyes or stare for too long at bright lights. 
The standard qualia theorist response seems to be far too concessive to the 
externalist. The externalist deploys the transparency argument to motivate the 
idea that the phenomenal character of our experience depends essentially on 
externally located properties. In other words, the properties that characterize 
the phenomenal character of our experience—the redness, roundness, 
plumpness, smoothness, ‘smallness’ and so on, are all externally located, and 
it is these properties which account for our perceptual experience of a red 
 21 
 
cherry tomato.17 If internalists concede that externally located properties are 
essential for the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience of a red 
cherry tomato, and claim only that we can also be aware of other (internal) 
features, they seem to be focusing all their efforts on winning a battle when 
they have already let externalists win the war. Moreover, I have argued that 
even if the qualia theorist is right that some properties seem to be properties of 
our experiences, this does not establish the internalist conclusion—that these 
properties actually are internally realized properties of experiences. 
IV.1 An alternative internalist response—first stage 
Internalists about phenomenal character should deny metaphysical 
transparency. After all, internalism about phenomenal character just is the 
view that phenomenal character is constituted internally (even though there 
will, ordinarily, be causal relations to externally located objects and 
properties). metaphysical transparency is therefore in outright contradiction 
with the internalist framework. 
What is more, the denial of phenomenological transparency is unnecessary. 
We have seen that externalists are not particularly forthcoming when it comes 
to arguments for deriving metaphysical from phenomenological transparency. 
Therefore, internalists can agree that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent but deny that this tells us anything about the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience. The fact is that, for the overwhelming 
majority of our perceptual experiences, phenomenological transparency is 
extremely compelling. During perceptual experience, it does seem that all the 
properties one is aware of, and which are essentially responsible for our 
experience having the phenomenal character it does, are externally located.18 
Since internalists do not need to reject phenomenological transparency in order 
to reject metaphysical transparency, it is open to them to take the easier route 
of acknowledging this phenomenological feature of experience. Again, these 
remarks are not intended to be an argument for phenomenological 
                                                        
17 I want to stay neutral here on the further issue of whether the tomato is represented as a tomato. See 
Siegel (2010) for discussion. 
18 Incidentally, it is interesting that participants in the transparency debate focus overwhelmingly on visual 
experiences. (I would like to thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.) The case for 
phenomenological transparency would seem to benefit from considering tactile experience, since these 
experiences certainly seem to involve externally located objects and properties. Of course, my arguments 
against the idea that we can derive metaphysical transparency from phenomenological transparency in the 
visual case apply equally to tactile experience. No matter how compelling we find the idea that our experiences 
are phenomenologically transparent, the claim that they are metaphysically transparent is entirely distinct. 
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transparency; qualia theorists may be right that some properties seem to be 
properties of experiences. My point is simply that nothing rides on whether 
perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent. Phenomenological 
transparency is no threat to an internalist account of the metaphysics of 
perceptual experience; it is perfectly compatible with the idea that phenomenal 
character is entirely internally constituted. 
It does, however, seem incumbent upon the internalist to deny the positive 
transparency claim understood metaphysically (M+). Although it may seem to 
the subject that their perceptual experience essentially involves properties 
which are externally located, the internalist should hold that the perceptual 
experience is wholly internally constituted. Our experience is such that our 
microphysical duplicate twin will undergo an exactly similar experience 
simply in virtue of being our microphysical twin. Our perceptual experience 
has the phenomenal character it does because of facts about our internal 
constitution. Of course (barring extreme sceptical hypotheses), there will be 
objects and properties that are in fact externally located, and which are 
causally involved in our coming to have the perceptual experiences we have, 
but these objects and properties are not constitutively or essentially involved 
in the experience itself. If we held constant all the internal features of the 
subject whilst varying the externally located objects and properties, the 
subject’s experience would remain the same.19 
IV.2 An alternative internalist response—second stage 
I have argued that the effort internalist qualia theorists have put in to produce 
properties which do not seem to be externally located has been unnecessary, 
so far as the debate about the metaphysics of perceptual experience is 
concerned. Their initial response to the transparency claim can be to point out 
that the question of whether the properties which characterise perceptual 
experience seem to be externally realized is entirely incidental to the 
metaphysics of perceptual experience. However, the internalist can say more 
than this. Instead of claiming that we can be aware of internal features of 
experience in some rare cases (blurriness, after-images and phosphine 
experience for example), the internalist can say that all perceptual experience 
is an awareness of internally constituted features of experience. In other words, 
                                                        
19 I should make it clear that my aim is not to defend internalism. I am merely describing the ideal internalist 
response to the transparency idea. Whether or not that response is feasible is a subject for another time. 
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seeming to be aware of externally located properties just is being aware of 
internally constituted features of our experience. 
Internalists can argue that the externalist who thinks that her experience is 
constituted by her standing in a two-place awareness relation to externally 
located properties (which we can all agree seems to be the case) has simply 
misjudged the metaphysical reality of her situation. We do not have to 
introspectively search our perceptual experience with the hope of finding a 
feature that does not seem to be externally located, in fact (or so the internalist 
can claim) our experience of every apparently externally located property is an 
example of being aware of an internally constituted feature of our experience. 
Of course, it seems to us that the properties we are aware of during our 
perceptual experiences are externally located; this is just what it means to say 
that perceptual experience is phenomenologically transparent. However, it is 
open to the internalist to say that this awareness of apparently externally 
located properties is in fact an awareness of internally constituted features of 
our experience. It is just that we are not aware of these internally realized 
features of our experiences as being internally realized features of our 
experiences. This explains why my microphysical duplicate twin will undergo 
precisely similar perceptual experiences to my own, simply by virtue of being 
my microphysical duplicate twin. To both of us it will seem as if the 
phenomenal character of our perceptual experience depends essentially on 
properties which are externally located, but in fact, what we are aware of are 
internally realized features of our experience. As I mentioned earlier (in 
footnote 2), whether the internalist should understand this awareness relation 
as a two-place awareness relation to qualia, or whether they should adopt 
adverbialism and deny that awareness here consists in a two-place relation is 
a further question. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
My claims in this paper have been rather modest. I have not tried to refute the 
externalist’s claim that perceptual experience is metaphysically transparent. 
Instead, I have tried to show that introspection can only be used in the attempt 
to establish the phenomenological transparency of perceptual experience, and, 
moreover, that the question of whether perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent is incidental to questions about its 
metaphysics. In other words, phenomenological transparency cannot be used 
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as evidence of metaphysical transparency. Although it has been useful for my 
purpose in this paper to assume that perceptual experience is 
phenomenologically transparent, it has not been my intention to establish the 
truth of this claim. I only wish to point out that internalists, who have typically 
denied that perceptual experience is entirely phenomenologically transparent, 
need not defend such a position. Internalism only requires the rejection of 
metaphysical transparency. This fact makes the internalist’s endorsement of 
metaphysical transparency for a large part of the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience rather surprising, particularly when we consider that any 
degree of metaphysical transparency contradicts the fundamental tenet of 
internalism. 
In the last part of the paper, I have suggested an alternative response to the 
externalist’s transparency idea on behalf of the internalist. Instead of allowing 
that much of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience depends 
essentially (and not just causally) upon properties which are in fact externally 
located, they can say: seeming to be aware of externally located properties just 
is being aware of internally constituted features of experience.20 
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